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CASE CITED 
Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp,. 820 P.2d 482 
(Utah App. 1991), cert, granted, 843 P.2d 516 
(Utah 1992) 3,6 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under U.C.A. §78-
2a-3(2)(k) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
It was error for the trial court to grant W.H, Burt 
Explosives1 motion for a directed verdict, because there was 
2 
a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the inferences to 
be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in favor 
of Mr. Bailey for W.H. Burt Explosives1 failure to warn. 
A motion for a directed verdict presents a question of 
law that has the same standard of review in both the trial 
and appellate courts as set forth in Steffensen v. Smith's 
Management Corp.. 820 P.2d 482 (Utah App. 1991), cert, 
granted, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992): 
A directed verdict is only appropriate when the 
court is able to conclude that reasonable minds 
would not differ on the facts to be determined 
from the evidence presented. Management Comm. v. 
Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 
1982) . A directed verdict cannot stand when, 
reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the losing party, "there is a reasonable basis 
in the evidence and in the inferences to be drawn 
therefrom that would support a judgment in [the 
losing party's] favor." Id. at 898; see Penrod v. 
carter, 737 P.2d 199, 200 (Utah 1987). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
RULE 
U.R.C.P. 50(a) 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS 
This case arises out of a mine explosion that injured 
Douglas Bailey and killed his friend, Wally Muir, while they 
were using safety fuse sold by W.H. Burt Explosives, Inc., and 
manufactured by Apache Powder Company. Plaintiff has settled 
with Apache Powder Company. The sole remaining appellee is 
W.H. Burt Explosives, Inc., and this appeal involves the 
motion for a directed verdict as to "the allegation in the 
complaint that W.H. Burt (Explosives) negligently failed to 
provide sufficient instructions and/or warnings concerning 
the use of safety fuse in blasting operations" (T.643, Line 
17), and the granting of said motion. ((T.655, Line 16) 
FACTS 
1. Mr. Bailey was injured and Mr. Muir was killed in an 
explosion while 25 to 3 0 fuses were being individually lit 
with a hand-held lighter instead of with igniter cord and 
igniter (thermalite) connectors. (T.376, Line 8) 
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2. The injury and death would not have occurred if Mr. 
Bailey and Mr. Muir had purchased and used igniter cord and 
igniter connectors. (T.640, Line 18) 
3. Defendant W.H. Burt Explosives filled an order that 
provided everything needed to light fuses by hand (T.433, 
Line 20), but W.H. Burt Explosives did not warn or instruct 
Mr. Bailey that he should purchase and use igniter cord and 
igniter connectors. (T.560, Line 18) 
4. W.H. Burt Explosives was negligent in filling this 
particular order for explosives without stating to its customer 
that he should also purchase igniter cord, igniter connectors, 
and stemming which would have prevented his injuries from the 
explosion that injured him. (T.560, Line 9) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It was error for the trial court to grant W.H. Burt 
Explosives1 motion for a directed verdict, because there was 
a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the inferences to 
be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in favor 
of Mr. Bailey for W.H. Burt Explosives1 failure to warn. 
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ARGUMENT 
WHEN THE EVIDENCE IS REVIEWED IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE 
TO MR. BAILEY, REASONABLE MINDS COULD DIFFER ON THE FACTS TO 
BE DETERMINED FROM THAT EVIDENCE, CREATING A JURY QUESTION. 
At the close of plaintiff's case, W.H. Burt Explosives 
moved for a directed verdict as to "the allegation in the 
complaint that W.H. Burt negligently failed to provide 
sufficient instructions and/or warnings concerning the use of 
safety fuse in blasting operations." (T.643, Line 17) 
A motion for a directed verdict presents a question of 
law that has the same standard of review in both the trial 
and appellate courts as set forth in Steffensen v. Smith's 
Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482 (Utah App. 1991), cert, 
granted, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992): 
A directed verdict is only appropriate when the 
court is able to conclude that reasonable minds 
would not differ on the facts to be determined 
from the evidence presented. Management Comm. v. 
Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 
1982) . A directed verdict cannot stand when, 
reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the losing party, "there is a reasonable basis 
in the evidence and in the inferences to be drawn 
therefrom that would support a judgment in [the 
losing party's] favor." Jd. at 898; see Penrod v. 
Carter. 737 P.2d 199, 200 (Utah 1987). 
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In applying this standard of review to the evidence 
presented during plaintiff's case, the jury instructions that 
would be given to the jury if the matter went to a jury 
should be considered. In opposing the motion for a directed 
verdict, plaintiff's counsel read an applicable proposed 
model Utah jury instruction to the court (T.650, Line 4): 
One who supplies a product for another to use is 
liable in negligence for injuries which were 
proximately caused by the use of the product, 
provided that the injury resulted from a use of 
the product that was reasonably foreseeable by 
the supplier. If the supplier knew or had reason 
to know that the product was or was likely to be 
dangerous for the use for which it was supplied, 
and two, had reason to believe that those for 
whose use the product was supplied would not 
realize its dangerous condition, and three, failed 
to exercise reasonably care to inform them of its 
dangerous condition or of the facts which made it 
likely to be dangerous. (MUJI 12.11) 
An additional jury instruction that would be given to 
the jury is proposed MUJI 3.6: 
Because of the great danger involved, those who 
are engaged in selling explosives are held to a 
higher-than-ordinary standard of care and must 
exercise extra caution for the protection of 
themselves and others. The greater the danger, 
the greater the care that must be used. 
An additional jury instruction that would be given to the 
jury is proposed MUJI 3.8: 
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When deciding whether a person is negligent, you 
may consider customs of behavior, such as local 
customs, business customs or industry customs. 
However, following a custom does not necessarily 
mean a person exercised ordinary care. It is 
merely a factor you may consider. A custom or 
standard may be negligent in and of itself. 
Evidence in this case includes Mr. Bailey's testimony 
in response to W.H. Burt Explosives' cross-examination during 
Mr. Bailey's case in chief (T.559, Line 22): 
Q. (By Mr. Christensen) I'm simply asking you if 
you're claiming Burt, not Apache but Burt, you 
understand that's my client, should have told you 
something that they didn't tell you? 
A. I believe they should yes. 
Q. And what's that? 
A. It—I didn't know it wasn't permissible to 
use the method I was using, because I have never 
had any problem with it. And as far—I do not 
believe that you were wrong in the product, 'cause 
you never had no way to know that the product was 
unsafe. I will say that, you had no way of 
knowing the product was unsafe. 
Q. Well, and are you now saying you believe the 
method you used was impermissible, was wrong? 
A. I'm not saying it was wrong; but if it was, 
at the time, I believe I should have been told. 
Q. Well, as I understood your testimony, you said 
that Burt didn't ask and you didn't tell them 
anything. 
A. That—that is true. 
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Q. You didn't go in and tell W.H. Burt, I'm going 
to go light 25 to 3 0 charges, stand there at the 
face and light those with a spitter, did you? 
A. No. I did not. 
Q. You simply bought the product and left? 
A. I bought the product thinking I had a safe 
product, yes. 
Q. And you're certainly not claiming you should 
have been given more of the Do's and Don't's 
booklets, are you? 
A. No. I'm not. 
Q. You had plenty of those, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And I've forgotten, yesterday, but it was 
established, as I recall, that you had received 
more than one copy with the materials you bought 
at Burt? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was something you were well familiar 
with, anyway? 
A. Pretty well, yes. 
Q. I am assuming that because of your long years 
of experience in explosives, you've passed tests 
in California— 
A. Uh huh. 
Q. —on the Do's and Don't's, you've trained 
other miners and so forth; that you didn't 
actually sit down after you bought the stuff from 
Burt and read the Do's and Don't's, did you? 
A. No. I did not. 
Q. You didn't feel like you needed to? 
A. No, I didn't, 'cause I figured I was using a 
safe method, yes. 
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Q. Well, and you figured you already knew what 
was in those? 
A. Yes. Pretty well. 
Q. Throughout your career, you've probably read 
those many, many times, haven't you? 
A. Yes. 
W. H. Burt Explosives' attorney explained the above-
quoted line of questioning as follows (T.624, Line 23): 
I asked him what he claimed in the way of things, 
factual events that happened when he bought the 
fuse, if, based on his experience as a miner, he 
felt something had been done improperly. 
Mr. Bailey ignited 25 to 3 0 white wax safety fuses 
individually using a hand-held lighter. 
Although the order filled by W.H. Burt included all 
explosives products needed to ignite fuses individually using 
a hand-held lighter, it did not include igniter cord, igniter 
connectors, or stemming. (T. 43 3, Line 20) 
The jury could reasonably have found from all of the 
foregoing that W.H. Burt was negligent in filling this order 
without stating to its customer that he should also purchase 
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igniter cord, igniter connectors, and stemming, considering the 
elements of the tort and the heightened duty of care set forth 
in the proposed model Utah jury instructions quoted above. 
CONCLUSION 
The case should be reversed and remanded for jury trial 
on the claim against W.H. Burt Explosives for its negligent 
failure to provide sufficient instructions and/or warnings. 
DATED t h i s /ft day o f Se 
ROBERT \H ./COPIER 
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11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Brief were mailed by First-Class Mail, 
postage prepaid, to Roger P. Christensen, Suite 510, 175 South 
West Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, this /j>Z- day of 
September, 1993. 
wp5\copier\ba iIeybr.app 
12 
613 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 51 
or may submit written forms of the several special 
findings which might properly be made under the 
pleadings and evidence; or it may use such other 
method of submitting the issues and requiring the 
written findings thereon as it deems most appropri-
ate. The court shall give to the jury such explanation 
and instruction concerning the matter thus submit-
ted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its 
findings upon each issue. If in so doing the court 
omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by 
the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by 
jury of the issue so omitted unless before the jury 
retires he demands its submission to the jury. As to 
an issue omitted without such demand the court may 
make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be 
deemed to have made a finding in accord with the 
judgment on the special verdict. 
(b) General verdict accompanied by answer to 
interrogatories. The court may submit to the jury, 
together with appropriate forms for a general verdict, 
written interrogatories upon one or more issues of 
fact the decision of which is necessary to a verdict. 
The court shall give such explanation or instruction 
as may be necessary to enable the jury both to make 
answers to the interrogatories and to render a gen-
eral verdict, and the court shall direct the jury both to 
make written answers and to render a general ver-
dict. When the general verdict and the answers are 
harmonious, the appropriate judgment upon the ver-
dict and answers shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A. When the answers are consistent with each 
other but one or more is inconsistent with the general 
verdict, judgment may be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding 
the general verdict, or the court may return the jury 
for further consideration of its answers and verdict or 
may order a new trial. When the answers are incon-
sistent with each other and one or more is likewise 
inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment shall 
not be entered, but the court shall return the jury for 
further consideration of its answers and verdict or 
shall order a new trial. 
Rule 50. Motion for a directed verdict and for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
(a) Motion for directed verdict; when made; ef-
fect. A party who moves for a directed verdict at the 
close of the evidence offered by an opponent may offer 
evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, 
without having reserved the right so to do and to the 
same extent as if the motion had not been made. A 
motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is 
not a waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to 
the action have moved for directed verdicts. A motion 
for a directed verdict shall state the specific ground(s) 
therefor. The order of the court granting a motion for 
a directed verdict is effective without any assent of 
the jury. 
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. Whenever a motion for a directed verdict 
made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for 
any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have 
submitted the action to the jury subject to a later 
determination of the legal questions raised by the 
motion. Not later than ten days after entry of judg-
ment, a party who has moved for a directed verdict 
may move to have the verdict and any judgment en-
tered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered 
in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict; 
or if a verdict was not returned such party, within ten 
days after the jury has been discharged, may move for 
judgment in accordance with his motion for a directed 
verdict. A motion for a new trial may be joined with 
this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the 
alternative. If a verdict was returned the court may 
allow the judgment to stand or may reopen the judg-
ment and either order a new tria) or direct the entry 
of judgment as if the requested verdict had been di-
rected. If no verdict was returned the court may di-
rect the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict 
had been directed or may order a new trial. 
(c) Same: Conditional rulings on grant of mo-
tion. 
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict, provided for in Subdivision (b) of this 
rule, is granted, the court shall also rule on the 
motion for a new trial, if any, by determining 
whether it should be granted if the judgment is 
thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify 
the grounds for granting or denying the motion 
for a new trial. If the motion for a new trial is 
thus conditionally granted, the order thereon 
does not affect the finality of the judgment. In 
case the motion for a new trial has been condi-
tionally granted and the judgment is reversed on 
appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the ap-
pellate court has otherwise ordered. In case the 
motion for a new trial has been conditionally de-
nied, the respondent on appeal may assert error 
in that denial; and if the judgment is reversed on 
appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in accor-
dance with the order of the appellate court. 
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside 
on motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant 
to Rule 59 not later than ten days after entry of 
the judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
(d) Same: Denial of motion. If the motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict is denied, the 
party who prevailed on that motion may, as respon-
dent, assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in 
the event the appellate court concludes that the trial 
court erred in denying the motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict. If the appellate court re-
verses the judgment, nothing in this rule precludes it 
from determining that the respondent is entitled to a 
new trial, or from directing the trial court to deter-
mine whether a new trial shall be granted. 
Rule 51. Instructions to jury; objections. 
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time 
as the court reasonably directs, any party may file 
written requests that the court instruct the jury on 
the law as set forth in said requests. The court shall 
inform counsel of its proposed action upon the re-
quests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall fur-
nish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, 
unless the parties stipulate that such instructions 
may be given orally or otherwise waive this require-
ment. If the instructions are to be given in writing, 
all objections thereto must be made before the in-
structions are given to the jury; otherwise, objections 
may be made to the instructions after they are given 
to the jury, but before the jury retires to consider its 
verdict. No party may assign as error the giving or 
the failure to give an instruction unless he objects 
thereto. In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a 
party must state distinctly the matter to which he 
objects and the grounds for his objection. Notwith-
standing the foregoing requirement, the appellate 
court, in its discretion and in the interests of justice, 
may review the giving of or failure to give an instruc-
tion. Opportunity shall be given to make objections, 
and they shall be made out of the hearing of the jury. 
ADDENDUM 
